



Disarmament and Security

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Question of: Regulating the Deployment of Hypersonic Missile Technology

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Signatories: Azerbaijan, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Guyana, Nigeria, United States, Venezuela

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that hypersonic missile technology, defined by sustained flight at speeds exceeding Mach 5 with high ability of maneuvering, presents severe challenges to strategic stability and the safety of the international community,

Alarmed by the reduced warning times and ambiguity in communications associated with hypersonic weapons, which increase the risk of miscalculation and unintended harm of civilians,

Emphasizing the responsibility of all nations to ensure that newly-developed military technologies are restricted and utilized in a manner consistent with international law and global agreements,

Affirming that transparency, dialogue, and multilateral cooperation are essential to preventing an arms race in hypersonic missile systems and escalation in conflicts,

Aware of the Missile Technology Control Regime's goal of preventing the proliferation of missiles, rockets, and unarmed aerial vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction,

Further aware of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Federation of Russia,

Reaffirming Resolution 80/23, which sought to limit the integration of artificial intelligence into military technologies such as nuclear command, control, and communication,

Acknowledging the Federation of Russia's use of hypersonic missile technology within the Russia-Ukraine conflict,

1. Calls for the creation of a brand new "System for Hypersonics; Enforcing Lawful Use, Tracking and Evaluating to Report" (SHELTER) sub-committee under Disarmament I which would seek to limit the proliferation and development of hypersonic missile technology with the sole exception of self-defense purposes through measures such as but not limited to:
 - a. The formation and continual updating of the Hypersonic Missile Control List (HMCT) which is an updated list of hypersonic related technologies that fall under its category that should not be exported so freely,
 - b. Oversight on missile speed, damage, and similar factors that assess the severity of missile technology of member nations with confirmed possession of hypersonic missile technology, ensuring that:
 - i. Missile tests are registered and do not pose threats to other states,
 - ii. Technology is not developed beyond confirmed defensive means, defining defense through UN definitions,
 - c. Establishes of a dedicated international expert group on hypersonic missile technology for the purpose of reinforcing definitions and providing immediate consultations, assessing security, legal, and humanitarian implications:
 - i. Providing technical advice to member states and international bodies on the current updates of hypersonic weapons,
 - ii. Facilitating dialogue between military, scientific, and policy makers to establish agreements without ambiguity and misunderstandings,
 - iii. Reporting findings and recommendations to the General Assembly on a regular basis,
 - iv. Requests the Secretary-General to report on developments in hypersonic missile technology and present recommendations for future international cooperation;

2. Authorizes SHELTER to introduce and enforce limitations on the creation, development, and import and export of hypersonic missile technology; limitations include the following:
 - a. Arms embargos of all hypersonic missile technologies for member and rogue nations, as defined by the UN Security Council, violating SHELTER regulations,
 - i. Canceling trading privileges granted by the World Trade Organization for a period of at least 6 months,
 - ii. Limitations participation in international defense-related forums on the violating state, such as participation in the ECOSOC committee and Security Council,
 - b. Travel bans for people of interest regarding the excess trade, and development, of hypersonic missile technology:
 - i. Travel bans are based on a majority vote of the SHELTER sub-committee and in cooperation with the Security Council,
 - ii. Proof must be provided in order to enforce a travel ban onto a country or person of interest
 - iii. Travel bans can be incorporated on significant people of illegal trade, usage and development of hypersonic missiles
 - iv. Member nations are capable of submitting people of interest for investigation under violation of this and possible travel bans can be implemented,
 - c. Creation and development limitations will be decided by SHELTER and will be up to the discretion of said sub-committee, where limits will be set to avoid technological advances,
 - d. Calling for strengthened export controls on hypersonic missile-related technologies and raw materials used for missile productions,
 - i. Updating a list of existing export control regimes to explicitly include hypersonic technologies and materials productions,
 - ii. Enhancing information-sharing on illegal networks that contribute to inappropriate ownership and developments of hypersonic missiles,
 - iii. Assisting states with limited ability in implementing effective controls on imports or exports to achieve the goal of limiting illegal hypersonic technology usage, potentially by the means of requesting the security to deploy UN safe keeping troops,
 - iv. Preventing the transfer of such technologies to non-state actors in the international community;

3. Requests that member nations begin cooperative development programs with fellow member nations for the development of defensive systems against hypersonic missiles for the pursuit of disarming and detecting mid-air hypersonic missiles:
 - a. An internationally managed early warning system, developed and maintained by the UN, and shared with all member states within SHELTER:
 - i. The warning must be a significant amount of time before the release of the missile,
 - ii. The warning system must provide a substantial amount of warning time so that civilians of the attacked nation can take cover or shelter,
 - b. All information provided by member is voluntary and all member nations have the right to withdraw at any point,
 - c. Establishes confidence-building and risk-reduction measures among states possessing hypersonic capabilities,
 - i. Establishing direct communication channels to manage crises,
 - ii. Urges states possessing hypersonic missile capabilities to adopt voluntary moratoriums on deployment until international guidelines are developed;
4. Strongly Urges member nations to limit their own proliferation of hypersonic missile technology through the following:
 - a. Limited research and development grants towards hypersonic missile technology,
 - b. Complete disarmament of hypersonic missile technology compatible with nuclear warhead, and immediate end of any nuclear development for hypersonic missile technology,
 - c. Additional protocols on speed, damage, and stockpile of hypersonic missiles such as the limitation to a speed of Mach 25 and below,
 - i. Safety protocols must be applied when developing and testing,
 - ii. Safety protocols must include the development and testing being performed in vacant or otherwise agreed upon areas,
 - iii. Specified safety protocols are to be determined by the sub-committee SHELTER;
5. Further calls for the prevention of development, use and testing of hypersonic missiles in any capacity besides a defensive one, through measures such as:
 - a. The definition of defensive use lies solely as retaliatory strikes,

- i. Pre-emptive strike strikes are strictly prohibited and efforts to disarm strikes on-route are allowed,
 - b. The imposition of sanctions on states that use hypersonic missile technology in an offensive manner,
 - i. Sanctions will be created with close assistance from the Security Council and are applicable to non-SHELTER members,
 - c. The exclusion of states that use hypersonic missile technology offensively from SHELTER and any of the benefits that come with membership;
- 6. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from the development, deployment, or use of nuclear warheads on hypersonic missile systems, recognizing that the combination of nuclear payloads and hypersonic delivery vehicles significantly increases the risk of miscalculation, rapid escalation, and unintended conflict, and further encourages the implementation of transparency measures, including:
 - a. Regular reporting within the SHELTER sub-committee on national policies regarding the armament and role of hypersonic missile systems,
 - b. Participation in multilateral confidence building measures, such as pre-launch notifications or information exchanges, conducted on a voluntary basis to reduce the risk of misinterpretation,
 - c. Invitations to voluntary peer reviews or observer missions, facilitated by the United Nations or relevant regional organizations;
- 7. Emphasizes the importance of integrating hypersonic missile regulation into broader strategic stability dialogues and international laws:
 - a. Incorporating hypersonic systems into bilateral and multilateral arms control talks regularly and ensure that international laws cover the legality of hypersonic missile usages,
 - b. Addressing interactions between hypersonic weapons and missile defense systems in more international paperwork,
 - c. Considering the impact on nuclear and conventional deterrence statuses, ensuring that the limitation of hypersonic missiles does not post a bigger threat to the international security,
 - d. Promoting regular high-level strategic consultations among major powers, ideally a regular bi-annual meeting between hypersonic technology owning nations,
 - e. Encourages the establishment of a UN-led dialogue on hypersonic weapons to:
 - i. Increase transparency regarding testing and deployment,
 - ii. Share information on risk reduction and confidence-building measures,

- iii. Explore possible arms control or limitation frameworks.